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ABSTRACT
In this paper I argue that a certain understanding of “animality”—or 
that a certain problematization of the traditional human-animal hier-
archy and divide—is central to Nietzsche’s account of the good life. 
Nietzsche’s philosophical project is primarily directed against those 
“metaphysical oppositions of values” that traditionally structure how 
we think, feel and live, and in this paper I submit that, for Nietzsche, 
the classical opposition between the human and the animal is the most 
basic and the most pernicious, for it undergirds the oppositional hier-
archy between rationality and irrationality that has turned human life 
against itself. I draw primarily from Nietzsche’s second “Untimely 
Meditation” and from a passage from Daybreak in order to make the 
case that, for Nietzsche, we must reject any facile ontological opposi-
tion between human beings and non-human animals and that we must 
recognize and live in consonance with the “animal” conditions of our 
existence: human beings must recuperate and reintegrate rather than 
suppress their “animality” in order to thrive. For Nietzsche, we can 
say that virtue is a certain cultivated balance between our “humanity” 
and our “animality.”
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We do not regard the animals as moral beings. But do 
you suppose the animals regard us as moral beings? 
– An animal which could speak said: ‘Humanity is a 
prejudice of which we animals at least are free.’
—Nietzsche Daybreak, a333
Nietzsche principally takes up a radical question: what is the 
value of our prevailing system of values? What are our values 
really worth? “What are our evaluations and moral tables really 
worth? What is the outcome of their rule? For whom? In rela-
tion to what? Answer: for life” (Nietzsche 1967, 148). Thus, for 
Nietzsche the only thing of real, ultimate value—the only thing 
that is truly an “end-in-itself”—is life itself; more precisely, it is 
the becoming of life (for life indeed is becoming); it is the unre-
strained striving and growth—the self-willing and “self-over-
coming”—of life, the nutritive and expressive labor of drives 
and instincts, the respiration of vital and creative energies, the 
full bloom and vigor of sensuous, animate existence. All of our 
values, then, are to be evaluated with respect to life: those val-
ues that serve and enhance life—those values that truly enable 
us to flourish, or those that enable us to live in consonance with 
life rather than in contradiction with it—are those that are to 
be affirmed and cultivated, while those that burden rather than 
liberate our lives and that therefore turn us against life, those 
that lead to exhaustion and decay—or those that are symptom-
atic of exhaustion and decay—are to be exposed as such and, 
hopefully someday, overcome. Nietzsche argues that our pres-
ent values—and that the whole system of metaphysical opposi-
tions on which they are predicated—have in fact perverted our 
better instincts; they have turned us against life.
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Thus, I would submit that Nietzsche is primarily concerned 
with the conditions of good living, and this qualifies Nietzsche 
as a thinker of virtue, a thinker of human flourishing (eudai-
monia). Here, I emphasize the term “human,” for any think-
ing of ethics—any thinking of what it means to live a good 
life—always presupposes an understanding of what the term 
“human” means, which is to say an understanding of what it 
means to be “human” in contradistinction to other forms of life. 
Thus, ethics always and from the very beginning draws some 
kind of distinction between human beings and other animals, 
and (following Derrida) we might go so far as to say that this 
very thinking of the human-animal distinction (whether or not 
it is ever made explicit) is not only at the basis of ethics but at 
the basis of philosophy itself. In short, any account of “the good 
life” is never, in fact, an account of “the” good life but always 
only an account of the good life for a particular kind of being. 
Philosophers have always offered accounts of “the good life,” 
but we must always ask: the good life for whom? And of course 
the answer is usually the good life for human beings. Thus, 
how we interpret the being of the human being—and how we 
draw or interpret the distinction(s) between human beings and 
non-human beings—will always direct (and will have always 
already directed) our idea of morality or conception of good 
living.
The kind of morality that Nietzsche generally opposes—the 
kind of morality that privileges reflection over sensibility, cal-
culative thinking over instinct, self-presence over “forgetful-
ness,” abstract autonomy over “heteronomy,” etc.—is essen-
tially predicated on a hierarchical opposition between human 
beings and other animals. Once we define “man” as a “rational 
animal” in opposition to all other, presumably “non-rational” 
animals, then all the rest follows: the good life for man will 
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consist in the fullest development and exercise of reason and 
(since reason “obviously” cannot bear any relation to unreason) 
will be as far removed from “animality”—as far removed from 
everything non-rational, from everything instinctual, sensuous 
and unconscious—as possible. Thus, Nietzsche’s moral philos-
ophy is fundamentally directed against this opposition between 
“the human” and “the animal” and against all of the other meta-
physical oppositions that attend to and perpetuate it.
For Nietzsche, traditional metaphysics is a “mobile army” 
of hierarchical value-oppositions, a “science” that operates ac-
cording to a particular binary logic: it posits a set of two terms 
(say, rationality and irrationality) that appear to be mutually ex-
clusive and then takes up the question: how can the one emerge 
from the other? Since these two terms are ex hypothesi mutu-
ally exclusive, it follows that one could not possibly emerge 
from the other and must have a wholly other source. Now, the 
terms under consideration are never “neutral”: one is always 
tacitly valued over the other (e.g., rationality is valued over ir-
rationality), and it is precisely this privileged term that is ac-
corded a “higher” source and place in the order of Being. Thus, 
rationality, for example, could not possibly have its source in 
irrationality, and it then becomes hierarchically opposed to ir-
rationality: irrationality refers to and follows upon everything 
base, everything “brute” and chaotic, everything bodily or sen-
sible, while rationality is handed down from on high; it is the 
gift and signature of our Creator. As Nietzsche puts it:
Almost all the problems of philosophy once again pose 
the same form of question as they did two thousand 
years ago: how can something originate in its opposite, 
for example rationality in irrationality, the sentient in 
the dead, logic in unlogic, disinterested contemplation 
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in covetous desire, living for others in egoism, truth in 
error? Metaphysical philosophy has hitherto surmount-
ed this difficulty by denying that the one originates in 
the other and assuming for the more valued thing a 
miraculous source in the very being and kernel of the 
‘thing-in-itself’ (1996, 12).
Thus, whether we say that it is “God” or “The Form of the 
Good” or the “thing-in-itself,” each privileged term in these 
pairs of oppositions is granted a pure, secure place in the or-
der of things, a place that ontologically transcends its opposite, 
a place in eternity. Now, Nietzsche casts suspicion on all of 
the oppositions that philosophy has taken for granted. Why in 
fact do we assume these oppositions? Why do we suppose that 
rationality is opposed to irrationality? Nietzsche suggests that 
these oppositions do not obviously carve the world at its joints, 
for our values primarily motivate these apparently “neutral” 
ontological oppositions: we posit rationality as really opposed 
to irrationality so as to indemnify the former against the latter, 
so as to maintain the “purity” of the former.
Nietzsche’s “radical” question, then, is this: why do we 
have these values and what are these values in the end really 
worth? Nietzsche argues that these value-oppositions consti-
tute the foundation of all of our systems of morality, for these 
systems have traditionally elevated to divinity rationality over 
irrationality, disengaged calculation over sensibility, the Abso-
lute over the situated or perspectival, etc; and for Nietzsche 
precisely these hierarchical oppositions have led to—and are 
themselves symptoms of—decline, for they essentially say 
“No” to everything this-worldly, “No” to everything wrapped 
around “this mortal coil:” “No” to everything sensuous and en-
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gaged, “No” to everything grounded in the immediacies and 
possibilities of concrete lived experience.
In short, Nietzsche rejects oppositional thinking. We know 
that Nietzsche accords ontological primacy to becoming, and 
this means that reality necessarily confounds and overspills all 
of our conceptual binaries. Reality is organized along ambig-
uous, shifting boundaries and orders of gradation, not along 
clear joints of articulation or according to poles of opposition. 
“The fluidity of all concepts, types and species” and the “lack 
of any cardinal distinction between man and animal” are doc-
trines that Nietzsche considers to be “true but deadly”  (1997a, 
§9, 112). Why deadly? They are “deadly” only insofar as they 
overturn traditional frameworks of Western thought, but these 
frameworks are in fact founded in forms of weakness, and I 
would say that for Nietzsche some “deadly truths”—perhaps 
like some “noble lies”—are necessary for human thriving.
Oppositional thinking fails to honor (and indeed represses 
and distorts) the complexities that we live; it tears into binaries 
what we live as fluid, ambiguous, multiple and intertwined, and 
indeed it does so at our own peril. Now, I do not think it is ar-
bitrary that Nietzsche emphasizes the “lack of any cardinal dis-
tinction between man and animal,” for (as I suggested above) 
the supposed opposition between human beings and non-human 
animals is perhaps the source of all of our other hierarchical op-
positions, all of our “oppositions of values;” at the very least 
it is implicated in them. This is perhaps clearest in the case of 
the supposed opposition between rationality and irrationality, 
for rationality has always been considered to be an exclusively 
human faculty; conversely, everything “irrational” has always 
fallen on the side of the “animal.” Nietzsche, again, repudiates 
any such opposition between human beings and other animals, 
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and in Daybreak (1997b, 125) he claims that rationality came 
into the world “irrationally.” Likewise, “humanity” (as every 
scientist now agrees) came into existence through “animality.” 
Irrationality always contaminates and conditions rationality, 
and our animality always contaminates and conditions what is 
“human” in us. Thus, for Nietzsche the “human” not only has 
its source in the “animal” but can never totally extricate itself 
from its animality, and it is precisely the attempt to do so that 
has made us human beings “sick;” it has made us not into better 
humans but into weak, burdened, alienated and repressed ani-
mals, into animals that have only become estranged from—and 
in no way superior to—our very animality; we human animals 
have become dangerously out of touch with the inescapable 
“animal” conditions of our life. Traditional moral philosophers 
begin from an assumed opposition between human beings and 
animals such that the good life for a human being is thought 
to be one that transcends animality. Nietzsche’s idea of human 
flourishing, on the contrary, takes its point of departure from 
the fundamental continuity between humans and animals. For 
so long we have looked in the mirror and seen the image of 
God, and for Nietzsche it is precisely this chimera of our own 
divinity that needs to be exorcised. 
Now, I hasten to underscore the following point: that Ni-
etzsche rejects any opposition between humans and other ani-
mals does not mean he denies that there are important differenc-
es between them; as I will elaborate below, he certainly thinks 
that there are deep differences between humans and other ani-
mals; but it is wrong (and indeed dangerous or unhealthy) to 
drive such differences into oppositions; conversely, it is wrong 
to think that the continuity between humans and animals ef-
faces any differences between them. Nietzsche does not (in a 
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reactionary and perhaps “romantic” vein) wholly privilege the 
“irrational” over the “rational” or the “animal” over the “hu-
man.”  Nietzsche truly rejects oppositional thinking, and this 
means that he does not simply invert our traditional hierarchi-
cal oppositions. Nietzsche’s claim that rationality originates in 
“irrationality” does not reduce rationality to irrationality, nor 
does it elevate irrationality over rationality: it only brings ratio-
nality back down to earth. On the same score, Nietzsche’s idea 
of human flourishing is indeed one that calls for the recupera-
tion of our animality; Nietzsche calls for the cultivation of all 
that is non-rational (and hence of all that is, in a certain sense, 
“non-moral”) in us, but this does not mean that he calls for a 
total regression to animal immediacy. Nietzsche does not argue 
that we should seek to retreat to some pure, prelapsarian animal 
“state of nature” but rather that we need to cultivate a certain 
balance between what is “animal” and what is “human” in us; 
he only rejects those moralities that posit the “human good” as 
absolutely removed from everything hitherto considered to be 
“animal,” for such moralities naturally place “the good” be-
yond this world, beyond carnal life, and they therefore only 
devalue and repress what we always already live.
Nietzsche argues, then, that we must recuperate our animal-
ity only so that we may achieve a healthier balance between 
what is inexpugnably animal and what is distinctly human in 
us. Another way to put this point is that Nietzsche is not an 
“irrationalist,” for he is only critical of excessive rationality, 
of the excesses of a kind of febrile “rationalism” that stifles 
active, involved living. I would submit that this balance be-
tween the animal and the human—which is broadly a balance 
between “instinct” and reflection—is precisely Nietzsche’s 
idea of virtue (or phronesis). Thus, I would say that thinking 
together the continuity and differences between human beings 
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and other animals is central to Nietzsche’s ethical project, and 
it is precisely this thinking—and the idea of phronesis or of hu-
man flourishing that follows from it—that Nietzsche takes up 
at length in his second Untimely Meditation (“On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life”), a meditation that opens 
with and proceeds from a discussion of a particular difference 
between human beings and other animals: thematic memory, or 
historical consciousness.
In the second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche posits an ab-
sence of historical consciousness—which is to say, an absence 
of any robust, thematic sense of time and becoming—as em-
blematic of “the animal:”
Consider the cattle, grazing as they pass you by: they 
do not know what is meant by yesterday or today, they 
leap about, eat, rest, digest, leap about again, and so 
from morn till night and from day to day, fettered to 
the moment and its pleasure or displeasure, and thus 
neither melancholy nor bored. This is a hard sight for 
man to see; for, though he thinks himself better than the 
animals because he is human, he cannot help envying 
them their happiness… ( 1997a, §1, 60).
For Nietzsche, most non-human animals are “blissfully” ab-
sorbed in the present: they are fettered to the moment, which 
means that they are unfettered to the past and future; and this 
also means (among other things) that reflection does not disrupt 
the rhythm of their of being and, moreover, that no exertion of 
reflection is required to carry on this rhythm; this means that 
here consciousness does not (and need not) interfere in the un-
folding of life; it does not take it up and carry it forward, nor 
does it threaten to arrest or repress it. “[T]he animal,” Nietzsche 
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writes, “lives unhistorically: for it is contained in the present, 
like a number without any awkward fraction left over”  (1997a, 
§1, 61). When consciousness does not intervene - when reflec-
tion does not ruin the unmediated, plenary fullness of each mo-
ment - life unfolds from one moment to the next without inter-
ruption and without effort; it inhales, it exhales, it grows, it 
strives and it dies without thought (and certainly without mem-
ory); in a word, “the animal” is forever forgetful: it becomes 
without awareness of its becoming: animal-being is becoming, 
the uninhibited movement of life. Thus, the condition of the 
animal is emblematic of our Edenic repose in the present, of 
that time before we became present to ourselves and to each 
other and felt the first blush of shame, of that time before the 
power of reflection expelled us from the slumber of paradise 
and made us sleepless, of that time before we became “human.” 
For Nietzsche, living is not a problem for most forms of ani-
mal life; it is only a problem for those peculiar animals bur-
dened with reflection and temporality, those animals who say 
not only “I am” but also necessarily at the same time “I have 
been” and “I will be,” those “clever” (albeit “unhappy”) ani-
mals who relate themselves to themselves, stretched between 
the past and the future. This is why Nietzsche begins his second 
Untimely Meditation—which is at its core a meditation on the 
relationship between forgetfulness (or “unhistorical feeling”) 
and reflection (or historical knowledge) necessary for human 
thriving—with a discussion on precisely this difference be-
tween human beings and (presumably most) non-human ani-
mals: historical-knowing, or awareness of becoming. We see, 
then, that animality is central to Nietzsche’s thinking of the 
good life (especially in the second Untimely Meditation, but in 
many other places as well), that Nietzsche’s thinking of human 
flourishing is also always a thinking of “the animal,” always 
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a thinking of the irrecusable non-rational underside of moral 
life. Nietzsche’s attention to animality is at heart an attention 
to what is unthought or suppressed in what we often take for 
granted as clear and necessary moral and metaphysical truths.
The above distinction between the animal and the human 
frames Nietzsche’s account of the future task of human think-
ing and dwelling. In the second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche 
posits that a certain measure of forgetfulness—or that a certain 
capacity to “feel unhistorically”—is necessary for life and ac-
tion, and this is why animal life proceeds happily, without a 
question mark; but we human beings have largely lost this for-
getfulness and suffer from a “malady of history”: an indigest-
ible surfeit of historical consciousness or reflective knowing 
that arrests growth and that estranges us from the vital task of 
living: the task of liberated thinking and desiring, the task of 
self-overcoming. Thus, for Nietzsche it is precisely an excess 
of that which distinguishes us from animals that has, in a sense, 
sunk us lower than animals. We know life and cease to live it, 
which is to say that we know too much, that all of our vaunted 
knowledge has ceased to serve life and has turned against it. 
Paradoxically, we must, then, relearn how to forget in order to 
move forward.
To feel historically is to feel the flux of becoming; to feel un-
historically is to forget becoming, to lose oneself in immediacy. 
Our power to feel historically has overwhelmed (and we might 
say repressed) our capacity to feel unhistorically, but I hasten to 
underscore that for Nietzsche we cannot simply forfeit the for-
mer in order to reclaim and affirm the latter. Health and growth 
always require homeostasis, and Nietzsche is clear that human 
life requires a balance of recollection and forgetfulness—a 
balance of reflection and “blind” passion—in order to thrive. 
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For Nietzsche, life is indeed “higher” than knowledge, but it 
does not follow that we can (or ought to) abandon knowledge 
in order to live. A certain degree of forgetfulness is not opposed 
to wakefulness but is the very condition of it, for what truly 
opposes wakeful living is, indeed, an excessive, hyper-vigilant 
consciousness. Thus, Nietzsche writes that “there is a degree 
of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical sense, which 
is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thing, whether this 
living thing be a man or a people or a culture” (1997a,  §1, 
62). Insomnia is not supreme wakefulness but, on the contrary, 
degenerate wakefulness, and it quickly takes its toll on the 
health of an organism. There is no real action and no real future 
without “forgetting.” Forgetting is always “fore-getting”: a pre-
reflective movement toward the future. But humanity cannot 
simply regress to a pure kind of animal immediacy, for we have 
indeed been exiled from the Garden of Eden. Thus, Nietzsche 
is clear that human life needs an appropriate sense history or 
measure of reflection; it needs just that measure of knowledge 
and reflection that can be “digested,” appropriated or “turned 
into blood.” 
For Nietzsche an excessive consciousness arrests and, in 
the end, suppresses activity and commitment; it is, indeed, a 
dis-ease peculiar to human beings, for only human beings can 
become so conscious that they repress and estrange themselves 
from the very “unconscious,” non-rational or “animal” ele-
ments of their being. This peculiar dis-ease—this hyperpyrexia 
of consciousness—etiolates our instincts or saps us of our ca-
pacity to act instinctually. Nietzsche calls for the rehabilita-
tion of our capacity to act instinctually, but what exactly does 
this mean? It does not mean that we simply act out our every 
whim. As we have seen, Nietzsche does not abandon rational-
ity in favor of some kind of “anything goes” irrationalism: he 
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argues for a certain mean between reflection and forgetfulness, 
for without a certain measure of reflection appropriate action 
is impossible, but without a certain measure of “forgetfulness” 
all activity—and especially moral activity—is also impossible:
As he who acts is, in Goethe’s words, always without 
a conscience, so is he also always without knowledge; 
he forgets most things so as to do one thing, he is unjust 
towards what lies behind him, and he recognizes the 
rights only of that which is now to come into being and 
no other rights whatever (1997a, §1, 64). 
For Nietzsche, an action must follow upon a certain kind of 
“blindness” (or “forgetfulness”); that is, every action is neces-
sarily an “oblivion” (or exclusion) of other possibilities, and 
our thrust toward the future is necessarily a certain rupture with 
the past and present. I can never throw myself into a certain 
task or project if I do not leave others behind; the instant of ev-
ery decision—and every decision is indeed a de-cision, which 
is to say a “bracketing” of other possibilities that enables one 
to be taken up and carried out—always happens without (or 
beyond) reflection. Reasons may often seem to precede actions, 
but actions never really follow upon reasons, for an action is 
only possible on the basis of a certain forgetfulness—a certain 
non-knowing—without which I would be stymied, or without 
which there would be no clearing or presencing of possibili-
ties in the first place. This is precisely what Kierkegaard means 
when he says that “instant of decision if madness:” Every act 
is an unreflective (or pre-reflective) movement of commitment, 
and this means that our actions are never truly mediated by rea-
sons, principles, calculations, or categorical imperatives; they 
are, in a certain sense, “unjustifiable” (hence “unjust”) because 
they cannot be deduced from a series of premises (or precepts). 
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Thus, without a certain measure of forgetfulness—and let us 
not forget that forgetfulness is, for Nietzsche, emblematic of 
“animality”—we would have no freedom to act; we would be 
frozen in the plenum of Parmenidean Being. The human being 
is, indeed, always already ahead of itself, always in some way 
comported toward future possibilities; but this comportment 
toward the future requires a certain suspension of the past and 
the present, which is to say a certain blindness, a certain “fore-
getfullness.” 
Nietzsche does not think that we can live entirely without 
reflection, but we cannot really live reflectively either. Thus, 
we need to know when to reflect and when to act – that is, we 
need to develop an instinct for appropriate action - but exces-
sive reflection enfeebles our capacity to act and eventually 
immobilizes us. Excessive reflection is, again, precisely what 
Nietzsche resists, and Nietzsche’s call for the recuperation of 
our (“animal”) instincts is only intended to curtail the excesses 
of Modern rationality. We see, then, that for Nietzsche thinking 
can turn against, weaken and pervert the vital conditions of its 
own existence. Thus, excessive reflection estranges us from our 
instincts, and this means nothing other than that it estranges us 
from life itself. 
Only a delusional idea of what it means to be human—only a 
tradition that opposes human rationality to everything “animal” 
or “instinctual” and that therefore posits human flourishing as 
the transcendence of everything animal or as the severe re-
straint of everything instinctual—leads us to think (and indeed 
to “live”) otherwise. Such a view leads us to think against life. 
Instinctual activity, then, is not the abandonment of thought but 
the reintegration of thought into life; in short, it means non-
rational (or pre-rational) comportment; it means a skillful or 
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cultivated responsiveness to the exigencies of our lived situ-
ations. Thus, Nietzsche claims that “unconsciousness belongs 
to any kind of perfection” (1967, 234) and that “genius resides 
in instinct,” for “one acts perfectly only when one acts instinc-
tively” (1967, 242). For Nietzsche, it is morally imperative that 
we develop and follow our vital instincts so that reflection does 
not become the “gravedigger” of all activity and commitment. 
This does not mean, again, that we forfeit reflection: it only 
means that reflection must serve rather than smother life, and it 
means that to thrive in the world—to live a truly “good” life—it 
is necessary not to live reflectively, for reflection is only ever a 
prelude to the time when reflection is no longer necessary. 
That perfect activity is “instinctual” activity means that 
genuine, healthy moral agency does not need to search after 
or demonstrate its own justification; it need not (and must not) 
follow upon some sort of utilitarian, contractual or dialecti-
cal calculus; the subject’s “reasons” have become so deeply 
in-corporated into his sensibilities that he is without “reason,” 
which is to say without consciousness of his motivations. Mod-
ern rationality, however, has discouraged and stifled this kind 
of moral comportment; it defines an action as morally justified 
only insofar as it has been tried before a tribunal of pure reason 
or passed through dialectical mediation, only insofar as it has 
been legislated on the basis of some antecedent internal cal-
culation. For Nietzsche, however, “real” morality—or genuine 
moral character—consists in instinctual comportment:
The appearance of moral scruples (in other words: the 
becoming-conscious of the values by which one acts) 
betrays a kind of sickliness; strong ages and peoples do 
not reflect on their rights, on the principles by which 
they act, on their insights and reasons. Becoming-
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conscious is a sign that real morality, i.e., instinctive 
certainty in actions, is going to the devil (1967, 228). 
Nietzsche argues, then, that morality as such is not solely 
based on rules or duties or on a conceptual, discursive under-
standing of rights, goods, and “oughts”; he argues that the in-
cessant search for rational moral principles and categories is 
neither the condition nor the seal of moral development but 
rather the symptom of a moral crisis, for one only seeks or 
formulates principles when one no longer knows how to live 
at all. Socrates represents the pinnacle of such a moral crisis 
because he relentlessly seeks and demands universal defini-
tions of moral concepts, and for him an action is not morally 
justified if it does not proceed from a conscious understand-
ing of such definitions. Thus, it is quite natural that Socrates 
often “paralyzes” his interlocutors; he reduces so many of his 
interlocutors to aphonia and aporia, and he is therefore appro-
priately compared to a stingray in the Meno (Meno perhaps 
knew the nature of virtue of perfectly well—which is to say, 
instinctually—before Socrates detained and interrogated him). 
Like Socratic aporia, such excessive reflection—or the restless 
demand for rational mediation—incapacitates us; it arrests ac-
tive living and renders us less responsive to the immediacies 
(or to the unmediated and immanent demands and situations) 
with which life confronts us.
What, then, becomes of responsibility and what, more pre-
cisely, does the recuperation of our instincts entail? As I dis-
cussed above, Nietzsche does not argue for some sort of rever-
sion to subjectivism; on this score, he lambastes the subjectiv-
ism of those “moralists” who take “beautiful feelings” or their 
“heaving bosoms” for arguments (1967, 223, 232). Thus, the 
rehabilitation of our “instincts” does not validate any subjec-
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tive, capricious “impression” we may have; it is a kind of phro-
nesis: a practice through which we develop and hone our pre-
reflective sense of which “impressions” are “valid” so that we 
may better comport ourselves in the world. Thus, for Nietzsche 
everything is certainly not permitted: 
It goes without saying that I do not deny—unless I am 
a fool—that many actions called immoral ought to be 
avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought 
to be done and encouraged—but I think the one should 
be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons 
than hitherto. We have to learn to think differently—in 
order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: 
to feel differently (1997b, 103). 
It is clear that Nietzsche does not embrace a kind of facile, 
wholesale rejection of all standard moral values (a la Raskol-
nikov); he only argues that we need to put our sound values on 
a new footing, that our understanding of which actions ought 
to be performed and which resisted needs to be restored to in-
stinct, and thus our performance of right actions or resistance 
to wrong ones needs to become instinctual. Nietzsche, then, 
does not reject responsibility; he only rejects a particular (al-
beit entrenched) notion of it. For Nietzsche, responsibility does 
not consist in the rational legislation of an action, but rather in 
a certain cultivated or sedimented responsiveness to life. Re-
sponsibility means response-ability or appropriate, pre-reflec-
tive comportment toward lived situations and possibilities.
Thus, for Nietzsche the future task of human thinking and 
living is to enact a stance between the nearly total forgetfulness 
of “the animal” and the excessive, sleepless consciousness of 
the modern human being. Nietzsche, again, does not call for 
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a reversion to animality but does indeed call for a certain re-
cuperation of our animal nature. We might say that the kind 
of forgetfulness that characterizes a certain traditional rational-
ism—the kind of forgetfulness that characterizes an impaired 
or lost capacity to forget—is precisely humanity’s forgetfulness 
of a certain kind of “animal wisdom.”
This is perhaps why we find so many animal metaphors in 
Nietzsche’s thought, and this is why it is not arbitrary that Ni-
etzsche employs such a metaphor in order to express the future 
task of human thinking. I am here referring to the “bird meta-
phor” that Nietzsche offers in Daybreak in order to prefigure 
the thinker to-come:
In the midst of the ocean of becoming we awake on a 
little island no bigger than a boat, we adventurers and 
birds of passage, and look around us for a few mo-
ments: as sharply and as inquisitively as possible, for 
how soon may a wind not blow us away or a wave not 
sweep across the little island, so that nothing more is 
left of us! But here, on this little space, we find other 
birds of passage and hear of others still who have been 
here before – and thus we live a precarious minute of 
knowing and divining, amid joyful beating of wings 
and chirping with one another, and in spirit we adven-
ture out over the ocean, no less proud than the ocean 
itself (1997b, 157).
This new breed of thinker is here compared with a migra-
tory bird, a creature that temporarily alights on little islands 
amidst the “ocean of becoming,” a creature that knows when to 
keep its place and when to take flight. For Nietzsche, the art of 
thinking and living involves a certain flexibility or fluidity of 
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thought and agency, a renewed attunement to the ebb and flow 
of becoming; it is an art of knowing how to remember and how 
to forget, how to reflect and how to act at the right time, and 
(as we have seen) this is the central idea of Nietzsche’s second 
Untimely Meditation:
Cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, 
confidence in the future—all of them depend, in the 
case of the individual as of a nation…on one’s being 
just as able to forget at the right time as to remember at 
the right time; on the possession of an instinct for sens-
ing when it is necessary to feel historically and when 
unhistorically (1997a, §1, 63, emphasis added).
Each island on which we birds of passage alight—like an old 
concept or a fresh insight—is a relatively stable though always 
precarious and beleaguered foothold amidst the chaos—the 
winds and tides—of becoming. Migratory birds have no fixed 
abodes, no permanent attachments; indeed, should they ever 
take up permanent residence they would quickly perish; they 
must know when to settle and when to take leave in order to 
live; their lives have and require no absolute foundations: they 
follow—they move with and are moved by—the winds, the 
waves, and the seasons; but this does not mean that they are 
ever without ground: such migratory birds cannot, after all, 
remain in flight indefinitely, nor can they swim. They cannot 
escape into orbit or forever soar above the sea of becoming, 
but they also do not drown in it. They have a hold on the world, 
however transient and variable this hold is and must be. It must 
also be stressed that the courses of their settlements and flights 
are never capricious: such birds follow the wisdom of their in-
stincts and the appropriately respond to the contingencies of 
life.
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And so it is—or so it must be—with the thinker to-come. 
This thinker must cultivate a kind of avian wisdom; he must 
abandon himself to wherever thought takes him, which is to 
say he must hone and follow his instincts rather than repress 
them; he must subordinate thinking and knowing to life or sub-
limate thinking and knowing into living; he must learn when 
to stake his place and when to take wing, when to remember 
and when to forget. And this is precisely that flexibility I men-
tioned above: human beings need ground on which to stand and 
build, but this ground is never unassailable and can never be 
permanent. If humanity ever throws down roots into the earth 
it will surely wither away with them. All of this is to say that 
this new breed of thinker thinks (and lives) in consonance with 
becoming rather than against it; but this does not mean that 
these new thinkers simply dissolve themselves in becoming, 
that they submerge themselves in the sea or scatter themselves 
to the winds; rather, they ride the waves to new and ever farther 
shores. For Nietzsche, the task of thinking is to organize the 
chaos of the world and in our-selves, not to revel or perish in it. 
We might say, then, that this task really is a kind of phronesis: 
the cultivation of a mean, a virtue of comportment. The human 
being, again, cannot retreat from becoming: he must live with 
it (that is to say, from it, or according to it), but this does not 
mean that he must give all of himself over to it: the former path 
is barred from us, and the latter path only leads to decay. To 
reengage oneself with becoming is neither to escape into dis-
engaged theoretical reflection nor to abandon oneself to abject 
chaos or irrationality; it is to take up and ceaselessly renew 
a stand amidst the flux of becoming and to “digest” this flux 
rather than be digested by it, to sublimate this flux into what we 
call knowledge and a “self.”  This is one sense in which human 
life is and must be “horizonal:” neither total forgetfulness nor 
absolute knowledge, but rather the one bounded by the other is 
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necessary for human life. Arrested in the past, there is no self 
to come, no future; arrested in the present, there is no self with 
a sense of becoming, no self with the sense of a past or future, 
indeed no self at all. We must, again, negotiate between total 
forgetfulness (absorption in the present) on the one hand, and 
an excess of historical knowledge and reflection (absorption in 
the past and the “blooming, buzzing confusion” of becoming) 
on the other. For Nietzsche, the cultivation of this equilibrium 
is the art of good living; it is culture as self-culture, and self-
culture is always self-overcoming, always returning to oneself 
as a self yet to come. 
In closing, I would not deny that other animals might in fact 
possess many of the features that Nietzsche reserves for hu-
man beings, but this is beside the point; the point is that phi-
losophers have always in some way (and indeed in many ways) 
opposed human beings to the rest of the natural, animal order 
of things and that the idea of the good life that has followed 
from this opposition is one that valorizes all that is considered 
to be distinctly human; but this kind of view—this system of 
values—has only made us into sick, unhappy animals, for ani-
mals we are indeed. We do not cease to be “animal” because we 
oppose ourselves to animals; all we do is repress our “animal-
ity.” The art of good, human living, then, is the cultivation of a 
certain balance between our “animality” and our  “humanity;” 
it is neither the repression of the former nor the deification of 
the latter. For Nietzsche, ethics can no longer begin from an 
opposition between the “animal” and the “human;” this means 
that we must reintegrate the animal into the human, but this 
does not mean that we should reduce the human to the animal 
or that we should somehow withdraw into animality (for to do 
so is neither possible nor desirable); this only means that we 
must bring the “human”—that we must bring ourselves—back 
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down to earth. Forgetfulness (the suspension of knowledge and 
historical consciousness) and an adequate sense of history or 
measure of reflection are both integral to flourishing as a hu-
man being. Nietzsche does not think that we can (or should) 
regress to our pre-human animality, but for Nietzsche there is 
nevertheless something that we can learn from animals, a re-
serve of animal wisdom that, yes, we must not forget. Insofar as 
our capacity to forget is one vestige of our animality—or inso-
far as instinctual activity is one valence of continuity between 
human beings and animals—then we must become a little more 
animal and a little less human, for we have, indeed, become 
“all too human.” 
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